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A PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
RESOLVING AN INTRA-COURT SPLIT ON CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION AMBIGUITY
By Erik I. Perez ∗
The Federal Circuit was created to ensure patent law
consistency by reducing inter-circuit splits. 1 For decades, the Federal
Circuit has oscillated between two standards associated with claim
construction. This Article attempts to explain, analyze, and propose a
solution to the intra-court split on claim construction.
Part I examines the historical overview of patent litigation.
This section briefly describes patent document sections, protectable
patent rights, and patent interpretation shifts, from relying on the
patent’s specification, to the patent’s claim. Part II examines current
patent law. This section briefly describes how patent claims are
interpreted and what role the specification aids in the interpretation.
Part III examines the Federal Circuit’s intra-court split
regarding the role that the specification plays in determining the
limitations imposed on patent claims. This section is split into four
parts: (A) the exacting presumption standard is analyzed through two
cases; (B) the holistic standard is analyzed through two cases and
subsequently compared against the exacting presumption standard;
(C) a proposed theoretical standard is explained and analyzed; and
(D) the current Federal Circuit standards are evaluated and analyzed
to determine which one is more likely to prevail.

Santa Clara University School of Law, J.D. I am immensely grateful to
my mentor Professor Colleen V. Chien who assisted me with this project and
inspired me with this article. I am also indebted to Michael Wang and Lilas
Abuelhawa for assisting me throughout the process of this article. The views
expressed in this article are solely my own and do not represent the views of
any institution with which I have been affiliated.
1
Paul Michel & John Battaglia, On Claim Construction, Predictability,
and Patent Law Consistency: The Federal Circuit Needs to Vote En Banc,
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/03/claim-constructionpredictability-patent-law-consistency-federal-circuit-needs-vote-enbanc/id=118481/ (Paul Michel is a former Federal Circuit Judge).
∗
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PART I: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PATENT LITIGATION AND
THE COURT’S SHIFT FROM RELYING ON THE PATENT’S
SPECIFICATION TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF A PATENT
RIGHT, TO RELYING ON THE PATENT’S CLAIM

Intellectual property includes intangible creations of the
human intellect. A patent is a form of intellectual property which gives
the owner legal rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling
an invention for a limited period of time in exchange for publishing an
enabling public disclosure of the invention. 2 If the right is infringed,
patent laws grant a cause of action against violators.3
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the courts
decided patent infringement disputes by comparing the accused
product with the patentee’s whole specification. 4 The specification
encompasses a majority of the patent document and is written entirely
by the inventor. 5 The specification has three basic requirements, where
the inventor must describe: the invention; the manner and process of
making and using the invention; and the “best mode” of carrying out
the invention. 6 In the nineteenth century, patents began to have claims.7
Claims are at the end of the patent and “particularly specify and point
out the part, improvement, or combination, which [an inventor] claims
as [her] own invention or discovery.” 8 In 1836, claims were statutorily
required in every patent application. 9
Even after the law required claims in the patent document,
infringement analysis continued to rely primarily on the
specification. 10 For example, George T. Curtis’ comprehensive 1849
treatise described infringement as “a copy of the thing described in the
specification of the patentee, either without variation, or with only such
variations as are consistent with its being in substance the same
thing.” 11 Curtis did not include an index entry for the subject of patent
claims. 12 As a later commentator observed, “the courts for a long time
did not regard [the claim] as the definitive measure of the scope of the
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
See, e.g., id.; Patent Act of 1790 §4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (establishing
liability of infringers); Patent Act of 1793 §5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (same).
4
George T. Curtis, The Law of Patents § 220 (1849).
5
See 35 U.S.C. § 111.
6
Id. at § 112.
7
See Curtis, supra note 4.
8
See Patent Act of 1836, § 6, 5 Stat. at 119.
9
Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876).
10
See Curtis, supra note 4.
11
Id.
12
See Id.
2
3
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patent” but rather looked to “the whole patent document, including the
claims as a guide.” 13
However, courts in the second half of the nineteenth century
began to place increased weight on claims for deciding the scope of
patent rights. 14 In 1869, the Supreme Court indicated infringement is
based on the “specification and claims of their letter’s patent.” 15 The
enactment of the Patent Act of 1870 modified the statutory claiming
requirement and stated “[the inventor] shall particularly point out and
distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which [she]
claims as [her] invention or discover.” 16 In 1874, the Court indicated
“[i]t is true the patent cannot be extended beyond the claim. That
bounds the patentee’s right. But the claim in this case covers the whole
process invented, and the complainants seek no enlargement of the
process.” 17 This led to the courts’ shift to using the claim language to
determine the bounds of the invention.
Now, the patent’s claims are the most important part of the
patent document. Claims provide the “portion of the patent document
that defines the patentee’s rights.” 18 By statute, the claims are set forth
at the conclusion of the specification. 19 The function of claims is only
to define the precise scope of the intellectual property rights.
Everything in the claim must be supported in the inventor’s
specification, and claims introducing new features not described in the
original specification are invalid. 20 However, Congress has not
specified precisely how courts are to determine what constitutes “the
patented invention,” thus leaving courts with the difficult question of
the scope of patent rights.
II.

PART II: OVERVIEW OF THE MODERN LAW OF CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION

Modern patent infringement litigation requires two key steps.
First, the claim construction determines the scope of the protectable

William R. Wood-Ward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent
Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 760 (1948).
14
See Curtis, supra note 4.
15
Blanchard v. Putnam, 75 U.S. 420,425 (1869).
16
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, §4(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
17
Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 606
(1874).
18
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
19
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
20
See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th ed., rev. 7 § 2161.01
(Jul. 2008).
13
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patent right. 21 Claim construction is where the court interprets the
claims to determine what the patentee actually invented and what the
patentee intended to protect. 22 During claim construction, the patent’s
claims are interpreted based on the patent’s intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence. 23 This claim construction is a prerequisite to the second step:
the infringement analysis. 24 Claim constructions are questions of law
reserved for the court, while infringement is a question of fact reserved
for the fact finder. 25 This paper focuses on how claims are constructed
in light of the specification, which is a type of intrinsic evidence.
A.

Interpreting a Patent’s Claim - The Laws of Claim
Construction

Claim construction determines the patent right’s protectable
outer limits. 26 Patent claim terms are generally given their plain and
ordinary meaning, which is the meaning they would have to a person
of ordinary skill in the art. 27 This person of ordinary skill in the art is a
hypothetical person, who knows the specification and prior art. 28 The
patentee may have characteristics of the person of ordinary skill in the
art but is not considered that hypothetical person. The skill level of the
hypothetical person is based on: “type of problems encountered in the
art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which
innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and
educational level of active workers in the field.” 29 “In a given case,
every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may
predominate.” 30 Additional guidelines support this general inquiry to
help the court determine the correct person of ordinary skill in the art. 31
Because the claim construction determines the scope of the
patentee’s rights and can determine the outcome of a patent suit,
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
See generally Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d
1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
23
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
24
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
25
Id.
26
See e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 510 (1917).
27
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14.
28
In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom
Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
29
Id. (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc., 807 F.2d at 962).
30
Id. (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc., 807 F.2d at 962–63).
31
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
21
22
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reliable methods of interpretation are important to establish consistent
court rulings. In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the en banc Federal Circuit
attempted to clarify various patent claim construction interpretation
issues. 32 The Phillips Court indicated claim terms are given their
ordinary and customary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention. 33 “[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art
is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular
claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the
entire patent, including the specification.” 34 Reviewing the
disputed claim terms in light of the intrinsic evidence is necessary
because this is how the person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand and interpret the claim terms. 35 Generally, the court will
attach different meanings to different words or phrases used in
separate claims. 36 However, this claim differentiation doctrine only
creates a presumption that the terms have different meanings, which
can be overcome by the specification and prosecution history. 37
B.

The Specification - Overview of How the
Specification Aids the Claim Construction

The Phillips court emphasized the specification is always
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. 38 It is usually
dispositive when the proposed construction most naturally aligns with
the patent’s description of the invention in the specification. 39 For
example, the specification may aid in claim construction where it does
any of the following: describes the invention’s preferred or sole
embodiment; excludes an embodiment from the invention;
distinguishes prior art or cites particular advantages over prior art; or
defines certain terms. 40 The court may look to these distinguishing
aspects to ensure that its construction aligns with these aspects. 41
32

Id.
Id. at 1313.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Anderson Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1369–70
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1368–
69 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
37
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
38
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1313–14.
41
Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350,
1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
33
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There are certain instances where a patentee may wish to use
words in their own particular way. In these cases, the patentee may act
as her own lexicographer. 42 Therefore, a patentee is free to provide any
definition for a claim term, often in the specification, regardless of the
term’s ordinary meaning. 43 However, the Federal Circuit has stated that
the inventor must clearly indicate in the specification or file history the
desired definition to overcome the presumption that the term’s ordinary
and customary meaning applies. 44
A fine line exists between construing the claims in light of the
specification and improperly importing a limitation from the
specification into the claims. In reviewing the intrinsic record to
construe the claims, a proper claim construction should capture the
scope of the actual invention. It should not limit the scope of the
claims to the disclosed embodiment or allow the claim language to
become divorced from what the specification conveys is the
invention. 45 The context in which the terms appear in the claim as a
whole is an important consideration in claim construction. 46 For
example, terms have different meanings if the patentee uses different
terms to identify similar claim limitations.47
Ultimately, claim construction is the first step in a patent
infringement suit. Success in an infringement suit requires a finding
“that the patent claim covers the alleged infringer’s product or
process.” 48 Because claim construction is a prerequisite to
infringement, typically patentees seeking enforcement want broad
interpretations of the patent claims. These broad interpretations would
increase the probability of a jury finding the patent claims cover the
alleged infringers product, leading to a finding of infringement.
Conversely, an individual seeking to avoid infringement would want to
narrow the claim language to decrease the probability of a jury finding
infringement.
While the claim language is distinct from the specification, the
specification is used as the foundation of claim language interpretation.
However, the Federal Circuit is fractured between two competing
42

Id.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
44
Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t America LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
45
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
46
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
47
Id.
48
Markman, 517 U.S. at 374.
43
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methodologies and has not established a clear rule in determining how
much impact the specification has on limiting the claim language.
III.

PART III: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
CIRCUITS INTRA-COURT SPLIT REGARDING THE INFLUENCE
OF THE SPECIFICATION DURING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

Extrinsic evidence was the starting point of claim construction
before Phillips. 49 Dictionaries, treaties, or other extrinsic sources
derived a claim’s ordinary meaning. 50 Phillips recognizes the delicate
and difficult balance because there “is no magic formula or catechism
for conducting claim construction.” 51 The Federal Circuit indicated the
specification “is the primary basis for construing the claims.” 52 The
Federal Circuit has reaffirmed “[t]he best source for understanding a
technical term is the specification from which it arose.” 53 Phillips states
“the claims are to be construed in the light of the specifications.” 54 But,
Phillips never defines what it means to construe claims “in light of the
specification.” 55 Phillips did not resolve the intra-court split about the
specification’s role in claim construction.56
Some commentators have described Federal Circuit
jurisprudence as a battle between warring factions. 57 For decades,
Federal Circuit panels have oscillated between two different
approaches to the role the patent’s specification plays in the claim

Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 262–
63 (2014).
50
Id. at 260.
51
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.
52
Id. at 1315 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d
448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
53
Id.
54
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49, 86 (1966).
55
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
56
Id. at 1313.
57
See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 4–5 (2000) (Nard indicates there are inconsistencies. Nard divides
the Federal Circuit judges into hypertextualists and pragmatic textualists); R.
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105–11
(2004) (They divide Federal Circuit judges into holistic and proceduralist
claim interpreters); Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for
Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 177 (2005)
(Miller viewed the entire area as being “in disarray”).
49
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construction process. 58 Part A of this Article explains the Federal
Circuit’s textual presumption approach, where a claim carries its broad
ordinary meaning and can be narrowed after overcoming a presumption
standard. Part B explains the Federal Circuit’s holistic approach, where
a claim can be narrowed by the specification. Part C explains a
proposed analytical framework, which merges the two approaches. Part
D theorizes whether the textual presumption or holistic approach will
prevail.
A.

The Presumption Standard – Claims Obtain a Broad
Meaning and are Narrowed if the Specification Meets
an “Exacting” Standard

The Federal Circuit has applied a presumption where a claim
carries its ordinary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill
in the art. 59 This heavy presumption can only be overcome if the
specification meets an exacting standard and demonstrates either: (i)
clear lexicography, a clear re-definition in the patent document itself
for the claim term-at-issue; or (ii) a clear disavowal of claim scope. 60
Since Phillips, the line of cases regarding presumption generally start
the analysis with the judge’s own understanding of the claim language
through the person of ordinary skill in the art, without any effort to
corroborate their understanding with sources in the field of the
invention. 61 In these cases, a judge should only consult the
specification in limited circumstances. 62 This section analyzes two
Federal Circuit cases: Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC and
Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp..
The Thorner Court explained the presumption standard. 63 In
Thorner, Judge Moore indicates a patentee acting as their own
58
See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 4–5 (2000) (Nard indicates there are inconsistencies. Nard divides
the Federal Circuit judges into hypertextualists and pragmatic textualists).
59
Starhome GmbH v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
60
See, e.g., Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365–66; Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at
1325–28; Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985,
989–90 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
61
Reilly, supra note 49, at 262.
62
Id.
63
Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1364–65 (The Thorner decision was unanimous.
The Thorner panel consisted of Chief Judge Rader, Judge Moore, and Judge
Aiken. Judge Moore authored the opinion. Chief Judge Rader was a part of
the Phillips majority.).
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lexicographer must “‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” 64 “It is not enough
for a patentee to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a word in
the same manner in all embodiments, the patentee must ‘clearly express
an intent’ to redefine the term.” 65
“The standard for disavowal of claim scope is similarly
exacting.” 66 The specification must make “clear that the invention does
not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the
reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the
claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered
broad” enough to encompass the feature in question. 67 “The patentee
may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed
meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions
of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of
claim scope.” 68 Yet, the use of the words “exacting,” “clearness,”
“intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning,” and
“manifest exclusion or restriction” does not necessarily clarify the
standard.
In Hill-Rom, the Court cites previous examples where “[t]he
standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” 69 HillId. at 1365 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d
1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
65
Id (citing Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d
1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com, 582 F.3d 1341,
1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
66
Id. at 1366.
67
Id. (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
68
Id. (quoting Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325); see also Home
Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
69
Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1371. Judge Moore cites to statements where the
patentee included: “the present invention requires”; “the present invention is”;
or “all embodiments of the present invention are.” Id. at 1372 (citing Regents
of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed. Cir.
2013); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1316–19 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1343–44; AstraZeneca AB v. Hanmi USA,
Inc., 554 Fed. Appx. 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential)). Judge
Moore cites to language from the specification which includes: “successful
manufacture” for a particular step “require[d]” a specific element; “pushing
forces” as opposed to pulling forces were “an important feature of the present
invention”; repeated disparagement of “an embodiment as ‘antiquated,’
having ‘inherent inadequacies,’ and then [the specification] detailed the
‘deficiencies [that] make it difficult’ to use”; the “specification described [a]
feature as a ‘very important feature . . . in an aspect of the present invention’
and disparaged alternatives to that feature.” Id. (citing Andersen Corp. v. Fiber
64
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Rom dealt with whether the patent’s claim term “datalink” limited data
communication technology to only physical or both physical and
wireless links. 70 The Hill-Rom majority found the exacting standard to
disavow scope was not met; therefore, “datalink” was not limited to
physical cables but included wireless and physical cables. 71 Judge
Moore stated the exacting standard was not met because the invention
language did not describe the invention using phrases like “‘is,’
‘includes,’ or ‘refers to’ [regarding] a wired datalink and there is
nothing expressing the advantages, importance, or essentiality of using
a wired as opposed to wireless datalink,” 72 “nor is there language of
limitation or restriction of the datalink.” 73 “Nothing in the specification
or prosecution history makes clear that the invention is limited to use
of a cable as a datalink.” 74 The patent’s specification does have some
language that has limitations which include “the terms ‘datalink 39,’
‘cable 39,’ and ‘serial datalink 39’ to describe the same component of
the preferred embodiment.” 75 However, the Court found these
limitations do not limit the “term datalink to one type of datalink—a
cable.” 76
In contrast, the Hill-Rom dissent found the term “datalink” to
be limited to physical cables. 77 Judge Reyna’s dissent begins by
highlighting the invention was patented in 1993, possibly implying
wireless communication was not standard at the time and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood the technology to be
limited to physical linkage.78 Judge Reyna reasons “the intrinsic record

Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Those statements
are not descriptions of particular embodiments, but are characterizations
directed to the invention as a whole.”); SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele–Made,
Inc., 497 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Chicago Bd. Options Exch.,
Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (“[T]he
specification goes well beyond expressing the patentee's preference . . . and
its repeated derogatory statements about [a particular embodiment] reasonably
may be viewed as a disavowal . . . .”); Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L., 450 F.3d
at 1354–55).
70
Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1372.
71
Id. at 1375.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1373.
76
Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1373.
77
Id. at 1383 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 1382 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“This construction literally
encompasses all data communication technology regardless of whether it
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is devoid of any description of a wireless ‘datalink’ structure.” 79
Specifically, the claim language recites “messages are sent ‘over a/the
datalink,’ ‘by a/the datalink,’ and ‘via a/the datalink.’” 80 While this
does not indicate a requirement for a physical cable, the patent claim’s
context indicates “[t]he only way the ‘datalink’ could also connect[,] .
. . while being ‘in line’ with the electrically connected ‘optical
isolator[,]’ is if it is a physical structure.” 81 For Judge Reyna, the
patent’s specification met the exacting standard and limited the patent’s
claim language to physical link cables.82
Ultimately, the presumption of the claims being interpreted by
a person of ordinary skill in the art promotes predictability and public
notice. 83 Professors Wagner and Petherbridge reason “embrac[ing] the
commonly-understood meaning of words [in the field], and plac[ing]
the burden on the patent applicant to clearly explain any deviations”
will ensure that “the meaning of claim language is readily apparent to
patent readers.” 84 Because patents are a type of property right, 85 it is
important that the boundaries of the right are clear. 86
B.

The Holistic Approach – Claims Obtain Their
Meaning and are Narrowed Based on the
Specification

The Federal Circuit has applied a holistic approach toward
claim construction. 87 The Federal Circuit allows the patent

existed in 1993 when the patents were filed, whether it was created yesterday,
or whether it shall be created in the future.”).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1383 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314) (“the usage of a term in
one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims”).
82
Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1386 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
83
Reilly, supra note 49, at 263.
84
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Jurisprudence, INT’L PROP. & COMMON L. 125, 128 (2013).
85
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (patents “long . . . considered a species of
property”).
86
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014).
87
See e.g., Kinetic Concepts v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., 554 F.3d 1010, 1017–
19 (Fed. Cir. 2009); On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Indus. Inc., 442
F.3d 1331, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136,
1142–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005); AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419
F.3d 1374, 1380–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Wang Labs, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
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specification to limit a claim term’s scope even when there is no clear
lexicography or disclaimer. 88 This section explores the analysis in
Nystrom v. TREX Co. and Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp.,
Inc. and evaluates and interprets the decisions through the presumption
standard.
First, Nystrom focused on the scope of claim 1. 89 The Court
initially found claim 1’s use of the term “board” was not limited to
wood by the patent’s claim language. 90 The Nystrom Court then turned
to claim 16, a claim not at issue. The Court found “claim 16, which is
similar to claim 1, covers ‘[a] wood decking board for use in
constructing a flooring surface for exterior use, said decking board
having a convex top surface, a bottom surface, opposite side edges,
and curved growth rings . . . .’” 91 Under Tandon Corp. v. United States
Int’l Trade Comm’n, the Nystrom Court presumed a “difference in the
use of terms has significance and that ‘board’ should not be limited to
wood that is cut from a log.” 92 If the Nystrom Court ended their analysis
here, then the “board” term’s scope would have been very broad.
However, Nystrom examined the language of the specification to
determine the context of the term “board” and concluded that the “term
‘board’ must be limited to wood cut from a log.” 93
The Nystrom Court never indicated it met a presumption. Yet,
in some way, it seems Nystrom implicitly met the exacting presumption
standard. The patent-in-suit used language similarly described in HillRom. Nystrom found “[i]n the context of the discussion of wood
flooring materials for exterior use, the patent states, ‘In all conventional
flooring materials known to applicant.’” 94 The use of “all” in the
specification is similar to what Hill-Rom indicates as relevant to the
presumption analysis. Nystrom explains the patent states “the process
used to cut such lumber from logs can produce inferior product on the

197 F.3d 1377, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 1999); O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., Inc., 115
F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
88
Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1138 (The Nystrom decision was unanimous and
consisted of Judge Mayer, Judge Gajarsa, and Judge Linn. Judge Lin was in
the majority of Phillips. Judge Mayer dissented in Phillips. Additionally, “the
petition for panel rehearing is granted for the limited purpose of addressing
the effects of Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).”).
89
Id. at 1143.
90
Id.
91
Id. (quoting ’831 patent, col. 5, ll. 32–35).
92
Id. (citing Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
93
Id.
94
Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1143–44 (quoting ’831 patent, col. 1, ll. 57–61).

104

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 39

outermost boards, often leading to scrap.” 95 Like Hill-Rom’s
explanations, the specification notes inferior products. Plus, the
“context [was] maintained throughout the written description.” 96
The patent-in-suit’s written description goes on to note that the
manner of installation of conventional decking boards “leads to
accelerated deterioration of the boards when exposed to
weather.” 97 Like Hill-Rom indicates, explanations of inherent
inadequacies of the invention or prior art greatly influence the analysis.
While Nystrom does not specifically indicate there is a presumption
that must be overcome, the opinion signals the presumption is
implicitly within the law. Additionally, Phillips was recently decided,
and the merits of Nystrom were tried shortly after Phillips was
released. 98 The new laws associated with claim construction were
newly explained and elaborated, and it is likely the court was
attempting to stay as close to Phillips as possible.
Second, Kinetic Concepts, decided in 2009, can be described
as employing the holistic approach. 99 In Kinetic Concepts the term
“wound” was at issue. 100 Defendants ask the court to adopt their
proposed “plain and ordinary meaning” construction, taken from
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary. The medical dictionary defined
“wound” as: “(1) trauma to any of the tissues of the body, especially
that caused by physical means and with interruption of continuity [or]
(2) a surgical incision.” 101 The Kinetic Concepts Court declined to use
the medical dictionary because it was “broader than the scope of the
specification and cannot be used to define ‘wound’ as used in the
claims.” 102 Kinetic Concepts limited the term “wound” to mean “tissue
damage to the surface of the body, including the epithelial and
subcutaneous layers” because “[a]ll of the examples described in the
specification involve skin wounds.” 103 The Court found, under the
Defendant’s construction, “wound” would include “fistulae” and
“conditions such as ruptured appendices and stomach ulcers” which the
“specification in no way suggests can be treated according to the
Id. (quoting ’831 patent, col. 1, ll. 65–67).
Id.
97
Id. (quoting ’831 patent, col. 1, ll. 34–35).
98
Id. at 1136.
99
Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1013 (Kinetic Concepts was before Judge
Bryson, Judge Prost, and Judge Dyk. Judge Bryson and Judge Prost were in
the majority in Phillips. Judge Dyk dissents in Kinetic Concepts.).
100
Id. at 1017.
101
Id. at 1018.
102
Id.
103
Id.
95
96
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claimed invention.” 104 This led to the Court finding that the patents
were not obvious and the patents were deemed valid.105
The Kinetic Concepts dissent first looks to the “words of the
claim [to] define the scope of the patent.” 106 Judge Dyk indicates the
specification merely illustrates the invention as useful for “treating a
variety of wounds.” 107 The specification does not, in its totality, narrow
the invention to skin wounds. 108 Judge Dyk cites the specification
which included broad language covering exposed bones, infected
bones, drained fluids, and surgical incisions through the abdominal
wall. 109 Judge Dyk indicates the “majority is incorrect in asserting that
‘[a]ll of the examples described in the specification involve skin
wounds’” because multiple “examples illustrate that the wounds at
issue are not merely skin wounds but” also other types of wounds. 110
The Kinetic Concepts Court used the holistic approach and
used the specification to limit the term “wounds” without needing to
overcome a presumption. 111 If the exacting presumption standard
applied, the Kinetic Concepts Court would have initially determined
the term “wound” contained a broad meaning. The meaning would
have likely been similar to the medical dictionary definition that the
Defendants proposed. The term “wound” would have been limited only
after the presumption was overcome through the specification. The
limiting of the claim language had drastic consequences in Kinetic
Concepts. Judge Dyk’s dissent suggests the specification would likely
not have been clear enough to meet the presumption standard to narrow
the term “wound.” 112 If the term “wound” was broad and incorporated
fistulae, then the court would have found the patent-in-suit obvious and
invalidated the patent. Paradoxically, the majority does not show
specific language from the specification to warrant their conclusion
that “[a]ll of the examples described in the specification involve skin
wounds.” 113
Kinetic Concepts highlights the subtle distinction of when a
court should limit the language of a claim. Under the presumption
approach, judges first look to the claims of the patent and give the
104

Id.
Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1019.
106
Id. at 1027 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 1028.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1028–29.
111
Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1028–29.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1018 (majority).
105
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claims the broadest scope reasonable to a person of ordinary skill in the
art. Facially, these judges do not necessarily use the specification to
limit the words of the claim but use the specification to determine how
a person of ordinary skill in the art views the claim language. These
judges interpret the scope of the claim language almost independently
from the specification once the person of ordinary skill in the art is
determined.
Under the holistic approach, judges consult the specification
much more often. They do not necessarily give the claim language the
broadest interpretation reasonable to a person of ordinary skill in the
art. They give the claim language the broadest interpretation reasonable
to a person of ordinary skill in the art while simultaneously limiting the
language based on how a person of ordinary skill in the art would read
the claim language if they could refer to the specification.
Ultimately, the holistic approach can be used because
“[l]imiting claim construction to the specific context of the patent is
justified as ensuring that the patentee’s exclusive rights are
proportional to what the patentee actually invented and contributed to
the field.” 114 “Proportionality, like predictability, is reasonably
grounded in the classic economic justifications of the patent system . .
. .” 115 However, the intra-court split is what creates the problem. It can
lead to inconsistent litigation and inconsistent outcomes.
C.

The Slide Scale - Proposing a Compromise Between
the Presumption and Holistic Approach

This paper ultimately culminates in the proposal of a
compromise. I propose a three-step methodological approach to
determine the limits to the claim language: (1) determine the person of
ordinary skill in the art, (2) determine the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claim language, and (3) determine the standard to
overcome presumption to narrow the claim language.
Step One: determine what constitutes the person of ordinary
skill in the art. A court must determine the abilities of the person of
ordinary skill in the art. Phillips signals the first step in claim
construction analysis is to determine the abilities of the person of
ordinary skill in the art. The interpretation rests in what this
hypothetical person understands and knows. 116 The patentee may have
characteristics of the person of ordinary skill in the art even though they
are not that hypothetical person. “In determining this skill level, the
Reilly, supra note 49, at 264.
Id.
116
In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom
Accessories, Inc., 807 F.2d at 962).
114
115
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court may consider various factors including ‘type of problems
encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity
with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and
educational level of active workers in the field.’” 117 “In a given case,
every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may
predominate.” 118
In practice, a judge determines the characteristics of the person
of ordinary skill in the art through the patent-in-suit and through expert
testimony. 119 The judge does need to sometimes make credibility
judgments about the expert testimony to ultimately determine what
constitutes the person of ordinary skill in the art. This step is a
prerequisite for all claim constructions because the claim language
must be interpreted through the eyes of the person of ordinary skill in
the art. However, it is important to not limit the person of ordinary skill
in the art based solely on the patent. The hypothetical person could
potentially interpret things differently based on the hypothetical
knowledge they would have based on their educational experiences.
For example, parties are litigating a baking recipe. 120 Party A defines
the person of ordinary skill in the art as a college student. Party B
defines the person of ordinary skill in the art as a chef. These two
individuals might interpret the baking patent differently. The college
student might understand caramelization as only being applied to candy
while the chef might understand caramelization as applying to all types
of food. While the patent should be able to teach the person of ordinary
skill in the art how to make the invention, this does not indicate the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the language of the claim.
Step Two: determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of
the claim language in accordance with the interpretation of the person
of ordinary skill in the art. This step ensures claim construction aligns
with how patents are issued and determined in the Patent Trademark
Office. “The Patent and Trademark Office determines the scope of
claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim
language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable
construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in the art.’” 121
This indicates all the claims, when patented, are given their
Id. (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc., 807 F.2d at 962).
Id. (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc., 807 F.2d at 962–63).
119
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 330 (2015).
120
For the purposes of this thought exercise, ignore any statutory or
constitutional issues associated with patentability.
121
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1216 (citing In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech.
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
117
118
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broadest reasonable scope and are defined through the person of
ordinary skill in the art. The scope of the claims is not defined by the
patentee but by the person of ordinary skill in the art. Any limiting
language present in the specification, which limits the patent, would be
incorporated within the broadest reasonable construction interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in the art.
The patentee may be the drafter, but the person of ordinary skill
in the art is the interpreter of the scope of the claims. A patentee may
define their own invention and act as their own lexicographer. In those
cases, the patentee’s interpretation of the language could be radically
different from the way a person of ordinary skill in the art interprets the
language. For example, a patentee may create an invention that defines
the bounds of a rectangle. 122 Assume the person of ordinary skill in the
art is a kindergartener. A kindergartner may not know a square is
considered a rectangle, so the kindergartner may not interpret a square
as a rectangle even though, geometrically, squares are rectangles.
There then becomes a fundamental issue with how the invention is
interpreted if the patentee’s understanding of the invention is radically
different from how a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret
the invention.
Step Three: determine the presumption to overcome the
broadest reasonable interpretation in accordance with the person of
ordinary skill in the art. The claim language should carry the broadest
reasonable interpretation to the person of ordinary skill in the art. Then,
courts should determine the differences between the patentee and the
person of ordinary skill in the art and use the differences as a metric to
determine the standard to overcome the presumption presented by
Thorner. If the patentee more closely resembles the person of ordinary
skill in the art, then a higher standard should be met. If the patentee
does not resemble the person of ordinary skill in the art, then a lower
standard should be met.
If a higher standard must be met, then the presumption
standard would look more exacting like in Thorner and Hill-Rom.
There would need to be repeated language in the patent specification
to indicate a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand there
is a deliberate departure from how they would interpret the claim
language. If a lower standard must be met, then the presumption
standard would be analogous to Nystrom and Kinetic Concepts. The
court may look at the specification and see if it would be reasonable for
a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand the language of the
specification narrows the scope of the claims.
For the purposes of this thought exercise, ignore any statutory or
constitutional issues associated with patentability.
122
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The justification for this sliding scale rests in the fact the
patentee and person of ordinary skill in the art are two separate
individuals. If the patentee is closer to the person of ordinary skill in
the art, there is a higher likelihood the patentee would use language and
context that is consistent with language used by the person of ordinary
skill in the art. The similarities between the patentee and the person of
ordinary skill in the art implies there has to be clearer language to
disavow the language in the claims to overcome the presumption.
Further, a patentee who is less similar to the person of ordinary skill in
the art, would be less likely to use the correct language, to understand
the jargon, etc.
Adopting the sliding scale approach would create a variety of
different legal questions. For example, how is the comparison between
the patentee and the person of ordinary skill in the art. I propose it
would be reviewed for clear error. This standard would coincide with
prior case law. 123 Currently, “courts construing patent claims must
sometimes make ‘credibility judgments’ about witnesses.” 124 There is
no fundamental shift in how courts will determine these questions as
most of the time it is implicitly done during normal claims construction.
However, the finding that the level of presumption has been
overcome would be a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Ultimately, this inquiry determines the proposed standard to overcome
the claim’s broad interpretation. While it may have factual issues, its
ultimate purpose is to determine a question of law.
D.

Theorizing Which Current Federal Circuit Standard
Will Prevail

The standard that will prevail is dependent on two specific
situations: (1) whether the Federal Circuit takes up this issue en banc
and (2) whether the Supreme Court grants certiorari.
First, the Federal Circuit is the only circuit court of appeals that
reviews patent law. The Federal Circuit does not have the inter-circuit
pressure to reconsider its earlier decisions. 125 En banc decisions are
incredibly rare in any circuit. It seems unlikely the Federal Circuit will
take up this issue soon. This is especially prevalent when the Federal
Circuit denied a request for an en banc hearing on this same claim
construction issue in Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788
(Fed. Cir. 2019). After losing in the Federal Circuit, because the court
used the presumption standard, Intel Corp. sought an en banc review of
Id. (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90).
Id. (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90).
125
Daniel Kazhdan, The Federal Circuit Should Be More Tolerant of
Intra-Circuit Splits, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 105, 105 (2016).
123
124
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the decision and was denied. 126 It seems the Federal Circuit is
comfortable with having a shifting standard.
However, if an en banc hearing is granted, the Federal Circuit
will likely adopt the exacting presumption standard outlined in
Thorner. The Federal Circuit has a propensity for clearly established,
easy-to-implement rules regarding to patent laws. For example, the
Federal Circuit has desired rules resembling bright-line rules regarding
section 101. 127
Additionally, the influence of Judge Moore and Judge Lourie
is compelling. Both judges have technical backgrounds. Judge Moore
“has written and presented widely on patent litigation.” 128 She co-wrote
a legal casebook and served as a law professor specializing in patent
law before her appointment. 129 Judge Lourie “was corporate counsel
for SmithKline Beecham, [and] practiced and wrote about patent law
before his appointment.” 130 Judge Lourie also authored the opinion in
Cont’l Circuits where the presumption standard was implemented.
Both Judges have drastically influenced patent law in the past decades
and influenced this specific issue. If the Federal Circuit does resolve
the intra-court split, the Supreme Court would likely not review the
decision. The Supreme Court seems reluctant to decide this issue at the
current time because it denied certiorari on this same issue in Intel
Corp. v. Cont’l Circuits LLC, 140 S. Ct. 648 (2019).
Second, assuming the Supreme Court grants certiorari, the
Supreme Court’s decision becomes more complicated. Because of the
limited judicial history of the newest members of the Supreme Court,
this determination is more difficult to theorize. The members of the
Supreme Court before Justice Gorsuch typically had a propensity to
prefer factor tests when it comes to patent laws.131 These types of factor
tests would coincide with the holistic view the Federal Circuit employs.
However, fundamentally, claim construction is an exercise of
legal interpretation. 132 In Teva, the majority highlights the distinction
between the factual underpinnings associated with claim construction,
which are reviewed for clear error, and the legal interpretations, which
See Intel Corp. v. Cont'l Circuits LLC, 140 S. Ct. 648 (2019).
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
128
Kimberly A. Moore, Circuit Judge, U.S. Ct. Of Appeals For The Fed.
Cir., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kimberly-a-moore-circuitjudge.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2022).
129
Id.
130
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote
in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745 (2000).
131
See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 66; Alice, 573 U.S. at 208.
132
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
126
127
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are reviewed de novo. 133 Many of the current members and newest
members of the Supreme Court prefer textual constructions. This could
indicate they would prefer the presumption approach as claim
construction is a question of law and a textual inquiry.
The historical underpinnings of the infringement analysis may
lead to inconclusive results. Justice Thomas’ dissent in Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. states “the pre–1937 evidence of this Court's
treatment of evidentiary determinations underlying claim construction
is inconclusive.” 134 Not much is known about how claim construction
analysis occurred. Most of the pre-1937 evidence is based on
infringement where courts determined infringement by comparing the
specification to the accused product. 135
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit’s doctrinal inconsistency on a claim
construction transforms the fundamental principle into a paneldependent outcome. The competing interpretations reflects the
“dissatisfaction with the case-by-case adjudication endorsed by
Phillips.” 136 Phillips’ vague standard allows for flexibility but creates
turmoil with consistency. 137 Judges and litigators will always be
concerned over what constitutes a correct interpretation. In an
analogous setting, statutory and constitutional interpretation has many
of the relevant questions which are related to intractable empirical
questions. 138 Because of this, commentators have indicated limiting
judges “to a small set of interpretive sources” to lead to more consistent
outcomes. 139 There is no talismanic way to determine the absolute
correct way to determine the scope of a patent. Language is difficult
and flexible. Patent law standards must reflect this flexibility while
promoting standards all can use.
Although, there is much exploration on this topic which
warrants further research. First, there are more cases from the
presumption and holistic line of cases which can be reviewed. Second,
these cases could be analyzed under the sliding scale analysis. This
would require meticulous research of the facts. Additionally, the record
may be silent on the patentee or the person of ordinary skill in the art.
Third, the “Third step: determining the presumption to overcome the
Teva, 574 U.S. at 330 (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90).
Id. at 338 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135
Curtis, supra note 4.
136
Reilly, supra note 49, at 264.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
133
134
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broad interpretation” could be a question of fact, which a judge could
not rule as a matter of law. Ultimately, having clear and consistent
standards of claim interpretation is vital to the U.S. patent system.

